Government formation in a two dimensional policy space by Aragonés, Enriqueta
Government Formation in a Two Dimensional
Policy Space∗
Enriqueta Aragonès†
Institut d’Anàlisi Econòmica, CSIC
April 2006
Abstract
Given any allocation of parliament seats among parties, we charac-
terize all the stable government configurations (supported by at least a
majority of the parliament) in terms of winning coalitions and policy out-
comes. We consider a two dimensional policy space and we assume that
there are four parties that care mainly about holding oﬃce, and only in-
strumentally about policy. We find that for any distribution of seats in
the parliament only two scenarios are possible: either there is a party
that is a member of almost all equilibrium coalitions (dominant party
scenario) or there is a party that is never a member of an equilibrium
coalition (dominated party scenario). We characterize the key party for
each possible scenario and we show that it is suﬃcient that the key party
has intense preferences over one the issues to guarantee the formation of
a stable government coalition.
1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze a bargaining model of government formation in parlia-
mentary democracies. We try to understand how a given electoral result leads
to the formation of a governing coalition. Our predictions are described by a
coalition of parties supported by a majority of votes, and a policy supported by
the parties in the coalition. We characterize all stable government configurations
in terms of coalitions and policies.
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There are diﬀerent spatial models of legislative choice that seek to describe
or predict how individual legislators make collective choices, and the model
we present belongs to this literature. Our contribution is an extension of the
analysis of government formation in a parliamentary democracy to a multi-
dimensional policy space. Krehbiel (1988) states that "expanding the dimen-
sionality of the choice space from one to two has profoundly disequilibrating
consequences." The main problem with a two dimensional space in a voting
game is the potential for voting cycles and chaos, as predicted by McKelvey’s
(1976) chaos theorem.
Following an important part of the literature we will use the concept of the
core, borrowed from cooperative game theory, as a measure of stability (see, for
instance, Moulin (1988) or Myerson (1990)). This assumption is particularly
relevant when we consider the formation of the coalition that sustains an exec-
utive in oﬃce on the basis of a confidence vote. The members of this coalition
consume all the benefits of oﬃce-holding, and have the control of all policy out-
puts. There is no binding agreement in this coalition: a non-confidence motion
may be proposed at any time.
Plott (1967) describes the particular conditions under which there is a non-
empty ’core’ in two dimensional voting games. In the legislative bargaining
model that we present the non-empty core conditions are satisfied for a large
range of parameter values. These conditions guarantee the formation of a stable
governing coalition.
We consider purely opportunistic parties, that is, parties that value their
oﬃce holding in the present and in future legislatures. We assume that voters
are ideological, that is, they care about the policies implemented. When facing
ideological voters, parties that care about holding oﬃce today and also about
holding oﬃce in future legislatures, may decide not to accept a proposal to
join a governing coalition if it implies the implementation of a policy that is
too diﬀerent from their ideal point. The reason is that by compromising their
policy position in the present they might jeopardize their vote support in future
elections. That is, parties will be concerned with their policy positions only to
the extend that this helps them to win elections.
We represent the parties payoﬀs in a reduced form by assuming that parties
care about holding oﬃce and instrumentally about the policy implemented. The
value that a party attaches to holding oﬃce today, that is, how much they are
willing to give up on policy preferences today, can be though as determined
by the party preferences for holding oﬃce in the future. Alternatively, one can
think of the value for holding oﬃce as an individual rationality constraint for the
party: it represents the maximal amount of utility that it is willing to give up
in terms of policy. A party that attaches a large value to holding oﬃce will be
willing to commit to policies far away from its ideal point in order to guarantee
becoming a member of the winning coalition.
We assume complete party discipline, that is, we assume that all members of
a party share the same policy preferences. Therefore, we define the preferences
and actions of a given party as representing the preferences and actions of all
its members.
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We focus our analysis on a two dimensional policy space and we assume that
there are four parties. We endow these parties with flexible relative intensity of
preferences between issues: their indiﬀerence curves with respect to policies are
not circles but rather ellipses.
Our analysis is mainly concerned with the parties’ negotiations in order to
form a governing coalition and to determine a policy outcome. Thus, we do
not model the electoral competition stage, we only take as given an electoral
result and its corresponding parliamentary representation. We assume that a
governing coalition can only be formed with the support of a majority of the
votes of the parliament, that is, it must be a winning coalition according to
majority rule. And we also assume that only governing coalitions can decide
on the policy to be implemented. In case a single party has a majority, it can
implement its ideal point on both issues. Our interest focuses on those cases in
which no party has a majority.
Since policies can only be implemented by a governing coalition, voters con-
sider that only the parties that are members of the governing coalition are
responsible of the policy choice. Thus, we assume that the payoﬀs of those
parties that are not members of the government are not aﬀected by the policy
implemented.
Given any allocation of parliament seats among parties, we characterize all
the stable government configurations in terms of winning coalitions and policy
outcomes. Our analysis shows that, for any given allocation of parliament seats
among parties, there are only two possible kinds of scenarios: either there is a
party that may form a winning coalition with any other party (dominant party
scenario), or there is a party that is not a member of any winning coalition
(dominated party scenario). We characterize the key party for each possible
scenario and we show that it is suﬃcient that the key party has intense pref-
erences over one the issues to guarantee the formation of a stable government
coalition.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section explains
where this paper fits in the existing literature, section 3 describes the formal
model and the equilibrium concept, section 4 characterizes the coalitions that
are equilibrium candidates, and section 5 characterizes the policies that can be
supported in equilibrium by such coalitions. Section 6 describes the equilibrium
outcomes, and section 7 contains some concluding remarks.
2 Related Literature
In many of the existing models it is assumed that parties are oﬃce-seeking,
that is, their payoﬀs depend only on whether they are members of the winning
coalition. Some of them consider policy blind theories, and model coalition
bargaining as a constant sum game. In this line we find the Minimal Win-
ning Coalition Theory by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953), the Minimum
Winning Coalition Theory by Riker (1962), and Leiserson’s (1966) refinement
of the Minimal Winning Coalition Theory using the ’smallest number of parties’
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bargaining principle. Other models assume that policy choice plays a role in
the parties’ payoﬀs. In some of these models policy is assumed to be an aid to
bargain, such as the Minimal Connected Winning Coalition Theory by Axelrod
(1970), and its refinement based on the smallest ideological range by de Swaan
(1973).
The assumption that we make on parties’ objective function is similar to the
one made by Austen-Smith and Banks (1988), where bargaining over policy is
a form of electoral competition. They assume that voters are policy motivated,
and choose their vote with the aim to aﬀect the policy outcome. They also
assume that voters can forecast the coalition that would form following each
possible election outcome and they can calculate back from this forecast to
decide how best to cast their vote. Our model can be thought of as a reduced
form game of their model of repeated elections, where we take as given the
reaction of the voters, and we extend it over a two dimensional policy space.
The theoretical work on coalition formation that assume more than one
policy dimension has to solve the problem of voting cycles and chaos. Some of
these models incorporate particular legislative structures, for example: Shepsle’s
(1979) structure induced equilibrium, Baron and Ferejohn (1987) on distributive
’pork barrel’, and its extension by Jackson and Moselle (2002) that includes an
ideological decision. Other models introduce uncertainty and imperfect infor-
mation, as in Enelow and Hinich (1983) or consider the role of party discipline,
as in McKelvey and Schofield (1987). Most of these works are concerned with
legislative politics in the US and they are ill-suited to explain the formation of
government coalitions in a parliamentary democracy.
Most of the work on the politics of coalition in parliamentary democracies
has been empirical, seeking to account for the coalitions that actually form. A
comprehensive survey can be found in Laver and Schofield (1990). Diermeier,
Eraslan and Merlo (2003) set up a model of government formation in order
to test the relationship of diﬀerent feature to a measure of its stability. And
Diermeier and Merlo (2004) estimate how the selection of the formateur aﬀects
the formation of stable governments.
3 The Model
We consider a two-dimensional policy space represented by <2. We denote a
policy by (x, y) ∈ <2 and we interpret x and y as positions on the two issues, X
and Y. Parties are characterized by their ideal points in the policy space and by
the value that they attach to holding oﬃce. Let (xi, yi) ∈ <2 denote the ideal
point of party i. There are four parties denoted by i = 00, 01, 10, and 11, whose
ideal points are (0, 0) , (0, 1) , (1, 0) , and (1, 1) respectively.
We assume that an election has already taken place, and the proportions of
parliament seats that each party has obtained are given by v00, v01, v11, and v10
for parties 00, 01, 11, and 10 respectively. We assume that v00+v01+v11+v10 = 1
and 0 ≤ vi < 12 for all i ∈ {00, 01, 11, 10} . For simplicity we rule out the case
vi =
1
2 . Indeed, many parliaments have an odd number of seats. And we do not
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consider the possibility that a party has a majority of the seats, that is, vi > 12
for some party i, since the analysis of this case would lead to trivial results.
We assume that parties are mainly concerned about holding oﬃce, that is,
being members of the governing coalition. We assume that only parties that are
members of the governing coalition care about the policy implemented, since it
may aﬀect their vote support in future elections. We assume that the payoﬀ of
parties that are not members of the governing coalition is not aﬀected by the
policy choice of the government. Thus, we normalize the utility of a party that
is not a member of the governing coalition to zero, and we represent the utility
that party i obtains if it becomes a member of the governing coalition when the
implemented policy is (x, y) ∈ <2 by Ui (x, y) . Therefore, the payoﬀ function of
party i can be defined as follows:
Vi (C, (x, y)) =
½
0 if i /∈ C
Ui (x, y) if i ∈ C
Where C denotes a winning coalition. Since we assume that no party obtains
a majority of the votes, parties are supposed to form coalitions and negotiate
over the policy to be implemented.
We represent by ki ∈ <+ the utility that a party derives from being a member
of the governing coalition and we assume that the utility that party i obtains
if it becomes a member of the governing coalition when the implemented policy
is (x, y) ∈ <2 is given by:
Ui (x, y) = ki − ai (x− xi)2 − bi (y − yi)2 with ai, bi > 0 and ai + bi = 1.
According to this utility function, parties’ preferences over policies are sin-
gle peaked, convex but not necessarily symmetric. The parameters ai and bi
represent the relative importance of the issues in the ideology of party i (see
figure 1). If ai = bi, both issues have the same eﬀect on the utility of party i,
thus both issues are as important in the ideology of party i. If ai > bi the first
issue is regarded as more important than the second by party i, and if ai < bi
the second issue is regarded as more important than the first. We rule out the
possibility that ai = 0 or ai = 1, since we are only interested in cases in which
a party cares about more than one issue. Since bi = 1− ai, we have that as the
value of ai increases, the first issue becomes more important for party i, and
therefore party i requires a more favorable compromise on the second issue for
a given deal on the first.
Notice that the utility that a party obtains from becoming a member of
the governing coalition, ki, may also be thought of as a reservation value: a
party will never accept to become a member of a governing coalition if it has to
support a policy that gives it a (dis)utility larger than its value of holding oﬃce.
Thus, the value of holding oﬃce defines an Individual Rationality constraint for
the party. Formally, the set of policies from which party i derives a utility of
zero, defines the boundary of the set of policies that are Individually Rational
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for party i, Ai = {(x, y) : Ui (x, y) ≥ 0}. The size of this set depends on the
magnitude of ki : the larger the value of holding oﬃce the larger the set of
policies that party i is willing to support in a given governing coalition. That
is, the more a party values to be a member of the governing coalition the more
flexible will it be in terms of trading-oﬀ policy.
Within this framework we define an equilibrium outcome as a winning coali-
tion and a policy compromise that induce a utility distribution that satisfies
the stand-alone principle. This implies that there is no other winning coalition
that could stand-alone with a policy that would improve the welfare of all its
members.
Definition: An equilibrium outcome is a coalition of parties C∗, and a policy
(x∗, y∗) ∈ <2 such that:
1) C∗ is a winning coalition.
2) There is no other (C, (x, y)) such that C is a winning coalition and
Vi (C, (x, y)) ≥ Vi (C∗, (x∗, y∗)) for all i ∈ C, with at least one strict inequality.
From the assumptions of the model and the definition of equilibrium we
obtain the following preliminary results:
1) The subset of the policy space that is relevant for the negotiations among
parties is the Pareto set, which in our case is [0, 1]2 (see figure 2).
2) The policies selected as equilibrium outcomes will be a subset of the poli-
cies that are Pareto Optimal and Individually Rational for all coalition members.
3) Generically, equilibrium coalitions must be minimal winning coalitions.
The first two results are directly implied by the assumptions of the model.
The last one requires an additional explanation. A minimal winning coalition
is defined as a winning coalition that would not be supported by a majority
of votes if one of its members was removed from it. Here we have that for
any policy outcome supported by a winning coalition that is not minimal there
is a policy outcome supported by a corresponding minimal winning coalition,
that is considered at least as good by its coalition members. Thus, the stand-
alone principle implies that generically we will have that only minimal winning
coalitions can be part of an equilibrium outcome, as predicted by von Neumann
and Morgenstern (1953).
Non generically, for some policies that are supported by a winning coalition
that is not a minimal winning coalition the corresponding indiﬀerence curves
for two of the parties may be tangent. In this case, if these two same parties
are the ones that form a winning coalition, the larger coalition may be part
of an equilibrium. But in this case, we will have that the equilibrium policies
supported by both coalitions coincide. Therefore, without loss of generality, we
will restrict our equilibrium analysis to minimal winning coalitions.
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4 Winning Coalitions
Given the proportion of seats of each party, v00, v01, v11, and v10, we analyze the
diﬀerent possible governing coalitions. From the preliminary results stated in
the previous section, we restrict our attention to minimal winning coalitions. We
characterize the diﬀerent possible scenarios scenarios in terms of the number and
structure of the minimal winning coalitions that are candidates for equilibrium
coalitions. Since we have assumed that v00+ v01+ v11+ v10 = 1 and 0 ≤ vi < 12
for all i ∈ {00, 01, 11, 10}, we may state the following results:
Proposition 1:
1) All winning coalitions of two parties are minimal winning coalitions.
2) There are always three minimal winning coalitions of two parties.
3) All coalitions of three parties are winning coalitions.
4) There is at most one minimal winning coalition of three parties.
All proofs can be found in the Appendix. Since only minimal winning coali-
tions may be part of an equilibrium, given the previous results, we have only
two possible diﬀerent scenarios in equilibrium: either there is a three party min-
imal winning coalition or there is none. In the first case, which we denote the
"dominant party scenario", the party that is not a member of the minimal win-
ning coalition of three parties must be a member of all winning coalitions of two
parties. In the second case, which we denote the "dominated party scenario",
there is a party that is never a member of a minimal winning coalition.
Proposition 2:
i) There is a minimal winning coalition of three parties if and only if there
is a party that is a member of all winning coalitions of two parties.
ii) There is no minimal winning coalition of three parties if and only if there
is a party that is never a member of a minimal winning coalition.
Observe that in the dominant party scenario, there are four minimal winning
coalitions: a minimal winning coalition of three parties that involves all parties
except the dominant one, and three winning coalitions of two parties, formed by
the dominant party plus each one of the other three parties. In our set up, each
party is always a member of three coalitions of two parties. In the dominant
party scenario, the three coalitions of two parties that include the dominant
party are winning coalitions, and for each one of the other parties only one of
the two party coalitions they belong to is a winning coalition.
In the dominated party scenario there are three minimal winning coalitions:
all of them are formed by two parties. The dominated party is not a member
of any of them. Each of the other parties are members of exactly two winning
coalitions of two parties.
A diﬀerent way to characterize the two possible scenarios is by considering
the relative size of the proportion of seats by the parties. Suppose that we order
the four parties according to the number of parliament seats each one controls
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and denote them accordingly, that is, v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4. We have to consider
four cases:
i) v1 > 14 > v2 ≥ v3 ≥ v4.
ii) v1 > v2 > 14 > v3 > v4 and v1 + v4 >
1
2
In these cases we are in the dominant party scenario. The party with the
largest number of seats is the dominant party.
iii) v1 ≥ v2 ≥ v3 > 14 > v4
iv) v1 > v2 > 14 > v3 > v4 and v1 + v4 <
1
2
In these cases we are in the dominated party scenario. The party with the
smallest number of seats is the dominated party.
Notice that since we have assumed an odd number of seats in the parliament,
no party can ever obtain exactly one fourth of the proportion of seats, and no
coalition of two parties can ever obtain exactly one half of the seats.
Finally, observe that in order to be in the dominant party scenario there
must be at least two parties that control more than one fourth of the seats,
while in order to be in the dominated party scenario there must be at most two
parties that control more than one fourth of the seats.
5 Acceptable Policies
A winning coalition of two parties faces a bargaining problem. A policy will
be acceptable by the coalition if it gives both parties a utility level of at least
their reservation value and it is Pareto Optimal within its bargaining set, that
is, there is no other policy that gives a larger utility to one of the parties and
no smaller to the other one, and satisfies Individual Rationality for both. We
define the set of policies that are acceptable by a coalition of two parties, i and
j, by A (i, j) . We show under which conditions this set is not empty and under
which conditions it does not contain the parties’ ideal points. First, we analyze
the sets of acceptable policies by coalitions of parties that agree on one of the
issues.
Proposition 3: Consider a coalition of two parties, i and j, that agree on
issue x at x = x:
i) A (i, j) =
n
(x, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 : 1−
q
ki
bi
≤ y ≤
q
kj
bj
o
ii) A (i, j) is not empty if and only if 1 ≤
q
ki
bi
+
q
kj
bj
.
iii) A (i, j) does not include party i’s ideal point if and only if kj < bj.
iv) A (i, j) does not include party j’s ideal point if and only if ki < bi.
This proposition shows that the set of policies that are acceptable by two
parties that agree on issue x is larger, the larger is the parties’ preference inten-
sity for issue x, that is, the smaller bi. The intuition is clear: two parties that
agree on one of the issues and care a lot more about this issue than the rest,
will have a lot of policies that would be preferred by both to their reservation
value.
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Notice that the set of policies acceptable by a given coalition is larger, the
larger are the parties’ values of holding oﬃce, that is, the less restrictive is the
condition of individual rationality. On the other hand, the larger are the parties’
values of holding oﬃce, the more likely it is that their ideal points are included
in the set of acceptable policies.
See figure 3. A similar argument can be applied to characterize the set of
acceptable policies by any coalition of two parties that agree on issue y.
Next, we analyze the sets of acceptable policies by coalitions of parties that
disagree on both issues but have the same relative intensity of preferences.
Proposition 4: Consider a coalition of two parties, i and j, that disagree
on both issues, and suppose ai = aj :
i) A (i, j) is not empty for all ai = aj if and only if 1 ≤
√
ki +
p
kj.
ii) A (i, j) does not include party i’s ideal point if and only if kj < 1.
iii) A (i, j) does not include party j’s ideal point if and only if ki < 1.
This proposition also provides a full characterization of the set of policies
that are acceptable by these coalitions, and the conditions under which these
sets are not empty and the bargaining within the coalition is not trivial.
The intuition in this case is similar to the one encountered before: the set
of policies acceptable by a given coalition is larger, the larger are the parties’
values of holding oﬃce, that is, the less restrictive is the condition of individual
rationality. On the other hand, the larger are the parties’ values of holding
oﬃce, the more likely it is that their ideal points are included in the set of
acceptable policies.
Finally, we analyze the sets of acceptable policies by coalitions of parties
that disagree on both issues but have diﬀerent relative intensity of preferences.
Consider the coalition of two parties that disagree on both issues 00− 11, and
suppose that a00 6= a11. In this case the Pareto optimal policies within the
bargaining set of this coalition are the solution to the following maximization
problem:
max k11 − a11 (1− x)2 − b11 (1− y)2
s.t.k00 − a00 (x)2 − b00 (y)2 ≥ u00
From the first order conditions we obtain a11(1−x)
b11(1−y) =
a00x
b00y
. Notice that in
general, if ai 6= aj the contract curve between two parties that disagree on both
issues is not a straight line (as it was when we assumed that ai = aj). Now the
contract curve is a concave or convex line depending on whether ai is smaller
or larger than aj (See figure 4).
Even though we cannot fully characterize the set of acceptable policies in
this case, we know that it has to be a segment of the contract curve of the
coalition determined by the Individual rationality constraints, and we have an
analytical characterization of this curve (See figures 5 and 6). Furthermore, we
can obtain a suﬃcient condition for this set not to be empty.
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Proposition 5: Consider a coalition of two parties, i and j, that disagree
on both issues and suppose ai 6= aj :
i) A (i, j) is not empty for any ai and aj if ki > 14 and kj >
1
4 .
ii) A (i, j) does not include party i’s ideal point if and only if kj < 1.
iii) A (i, j) does not include party j’s ideal point if and only if ki < 1.
Similarly, a winning coalition of three parties also faces a bargaining problem.
A policy will be acceptable by the coalition if it gives to all parties in the coalition
a utility level of at least their reservation value and it is Pareto Optimal within
its bargaining set.
Consider coalition 01−11−10. The set of policies that satisfy the Individual
Rationality conditions for all three parties are the pairs (x, y) that satisfy the
following three conditions:
k01 − a01 (x)2 − b01 (1− y)2 ≥ 0
k10 − a10 (1− x)2 − b10 (y)2 ≥ 0
k11 − a11 (1− x)2 − b11 (1− y)2 ≥ 0
Notice that with respect to the set of policies that satisfy Individual Ratio-
nality for all three parties, all policies are also Pareto optimal. Therefore, these
conditions define the set of acceptable policies by the coalition of three parties.
See figures 7 and 8. Let A (01, 11, 10) denote this set.
For this set to be non-empty it is necessary that the conditions stated in the
propositions of the previous section hold, that is, it is necessary that the set of
acceptable policies of each coalition of two parties involved in the three party
coalition are not empty. And in addition, it is also necessary that these sets
have a non empty intersection.
Therefore, the set of policies that are acceptable by a coalition of three parties
is not empty if for all parties i in the coalition, ki are large enough.
That is, the sets of policies that are individually rational for each one of the
coalition members are large enough so that their intersection is not empty. The
conditions that guarantee a non trivial bargaining within the members of the
coalition, are not restrictive in this case.
Observe that, given the utility functions of the parties, the set of policies that
are acceptable by a coalition of three parties, when it is not empty, is a compact
set and the policy that maximizes the utility of a given party within this set is
well defined and it is unique. Let (xi (01− 11− 10) , yi (01− 11− 10)) denote
the policy that maximizes the utility of party i within the set of acceptable
policies of the three party coalition 01− 11− 10, for some i ∈ {01, 11, 10}. This
implies that Uj (xi (01− 11− 10) , yi (01− 11− 10)) = 0 for at least one party
j in the coalition with j 6= i. In particular, for party 11 we have that for all
j 6= 11, Uj (x11 (01− 11− 10) , y11 (01− 11− 10)) = 0.
This analysis provides a full characterization of the set of policies that are
acceptable by the coalitions, and conditions under which these sets are not
empty. These conditions involve restrictions on the range of parameter values
and they have to be satisfied by any party that is part of an equilibrium coalition.
Finally, it provides conditions under which these sets do not include the parties’
ideal points. We are going to impose these conditions in order to guarantee
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bargaining among the parties in a coalition is not trivial. Thus, the combination
of these conditions implies that we will analyze the bargaining among parties
whose value of holding oﬃce is not too large, and not too small.
6 Equilibrium Outcomes
In this section we assume that the set of acceptable policies for each one of the
relevant winning coalitions, A (C) , is not empty and it does not contain any of
the ideal points of its members. This assumption only imposes restrictions on
the possible values of ki for all i, that is, the value of holding oﬃce for each party
is large enough so that the set of policies that it finds acceptable intersects with
each one of the other parties’ set of acceptable policies; and it is small enough
so that these intersections do not include the parties ideal points.
We find that, given a set of parameter values (ki, vi, ai) for i ∈ {00, 01, 11, 10},
generically the equilibrium outcome is unique in terms of equilibrium coalitions.
To prove this claim suppose that for a given set of parameter values we have
two equilibrium outcomes (C∗, (x∗, y∗)) and
³
C∗
0
,
³
x∗
0
, y∗
0
´´
then:
1) If C∗ and C∗
0
have an empty intersection, then they are complements to
each other, and we know that the complement of a winning coalition is a losing
coalition. Thus, they cannot be both part of equilibrium outcomes.
2) If C∗ and C∗
0
have a non empty intersection, then generically a party
member of the intersection would prefer one policy outcome to the other one,
in which case the outcome corresponding to the least preferred policy could not
be an equilibrium.
Thus, in order to have multiple equilibria there has to be a party i that is
a member of both C∗ and C∗
0
and in addition this party must be indiﬀerent
between (x∗, y∗) and
³
x∗
0
, y∗
0
´
, which can only happen generically.
6.1 Dominated Party Scenario
In order to characterize the equilibrium outcomes in the "dominated party sce-
nario" without loss of generality we consider a particular case in which the
dominated party is party 10 and the minimal winning coalitions are given by:
00− 01, 00− 11, and 01− 11.
The relevant strategies in this scenario are the following: party 00may accept
to form a coalition with either party 01 or party 11; party 01 may accept to
form a coalition with either party 00 or party 11; finally, party 11 may accept to
form a coalition with either party 00 or party 01.We find that coalition 00− 01
forms in equilibrium if and only if party 01’s relative preference intensity for
issue x is large enough. Similarly, we can prove that coalition 01 − 11 forms
in equilibrium if and only if party 01’s relative preference intensity for issue x
is small enough. Otherwise, existence of equilibrium is only guaranteed under
certain conditions and when they hold coalition 00− 11 forms.
Theorem 1:
11
In the "dominated party scenario" when a00 = a11:
i) Coalition 00− 01 forms in equilibrium if and only if a01 ≥ a01
ii) Coalition 01− 11 forms in equilibrium if and only if a01 ≤ a01
iii) Coalition 00−11 forms in equilibrium if and only if 1 ≤ √a11
³
1−
q
k01
a01
´
+
√
b00
³
1−
q
k01
b01
´
The two thresholds are given by: a01 = 1
1+


1−
r
k11
a11
1−
1−
√
k11√
b00


2 and
a01
1
1+


1−
1−
√
k00√a11
1−
r
k00
b00


2 .
This theorem characterizes the parameter values for which an equilibrium
exists. Otherwise, we obtain cycles in the negotiations between the parties,
in which case the governing coalitions that may form would be unstable. For
a00 = a11 we have characterized the equilibrium outcomes for the dominated
party scenario according to the values of a01. We find that for values of a01 small
enough, the unique equilibrium coalition is 01 − 11 and the set of equilibrium
policies is given by
A∗ (01, 11) =
n
(x, 1) ∈ [0, 1]2 : 1− 1−
√
k00√
a11
≤ x ≤
q
b01
a01
³
1−
q
k00
b00
´o
The range of values of a01 for which coalition 01−11 is part of an equilibrium
outcome is larger if k00 and a11 are smaller and b00 is larger (see figure 9).
Similarly, for values of a01 large enough, the unique equilibrium coalition is
01− 00 and the set of equilibrium policies is given by
A∗ (00, 01) =
n
(0, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 : 1−
q
a01
b01
³
1−
q
k11
a11
´
≤ y ≤ 1−
√
k11√
b00
o
The range of values of a01 for which coalition 01−00 is part of an equilibrium
outcome is larger if k11 and b00 are smaller and a11 is larger (see figure 10).
For intermediate values of a01, coalition 00 − 11 may form in equilibrium
only if a00 and b11 are large enough and k01 is small enough (see figure 11).
We have shown that the parameter value that determines which equilibrium
prevails in this case is a01 (see figure 12). Observe that the conditions for
existence of equilibria with governing coalitions 01 − 00 and 01 − 11 are much
weaker that those needed for the equilibria with governing coalition 00 − 11.
Thus, it seems most likely that the decision of party 01 will determine which
governing coalition forms when party 10 is a dominated party. Therefore, even
if party 01 is not a dominant party it has the key to determine the government
composition. We will call this party the ’key party’ of the ’dominated party
scenario. Notice that the key party in this scenario is always characterized
by disagreeing on all issues with the dominated party. Finally, observe that
the intuition behind this result carries over to the case of a00 6= a11, and the
qualitative results obtained here can be reproduced in the more general case.
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6.2 Dominant Party Scenario
In order to analyze the equilibrium outcomes in the "dominant party scenario"
without loss of generality we consider a particular case in which the dominant
party is party 00 and the minimal winning coalitions are given by: 01 − 11 −
10, 00− 01, 00− 11, and 00− 10.
In this scenario, party 00 may decide to form a coalition with any of the
other three parties, and each one of the other parties may decide to accept a
proposal from party 00 or to join the three party coalition 01− 11− 10. Thus
there are four possible outcomes in this scenario. We find that coalition 00− 01
forms in equilibrium if and only if party 00’s relative preference intensity for
issue x is large enough. Similarly, we can prove that coalition 00− 10 forms in
equilibrium if and only if party 00’s relative preference intensity for issue x is
small enough. We show that coalition 00−11 cannot be a part of an equilibrium.
Otherwise, existence of equilibrium is only guaranteed under certain conditions
and when they hold coalition 01−11−10 forms. Finally, we show that coalition
00− 11 cannot be a part of an equilibrium.
Theorem 2:
In the "dominant party scenario" when a00 = a11 and a01 = a10:
i) Coalition 00− 01 forms in equilibrium if and only if a00 ≥ a00
ii) Coalition 00− 10 forms in equilibrium if and only if a00 ≤ a00
iii) Coalition 01−11−10 forms in equilibrium if and only if 1 ≤ √a01
³
1−
q
k00
a00
´
+
√
b10
³
1−
q
k00
b00
´
.
iv) Coalition 00− 11 never forms in equilibrium.
The two thresholds are given by: a00 = 1−
Ã
1−
√
k11
1− 1−
√
k10√
b01
!2
and
a00 =
Ã
1−
√
k11
1− 1−
√
k01√a10
!2
.
This theorem characterizes the parameter values for which an equilibrium
exists. Otherwise, we obtain cycles in the negotiations between the parties,
in which case the governing coalitions that may form would be unstable. For
a00 = a11 and a01 = a10 we have characterized the equilibrium outcomes for the
dominant party scenario according to the values of a00. We find that for values
of a00 small enough, the unique equilibrium coalition is 00 − 10 and the set of
equilibrium policies is given by
A∗ (00, 10) =
n
(x, 0) ∈ [0, 1]2 : 1− 1−
√
k01√
a01
≤ x ≤ min
nq
b00
a00
³
1−
q
k01
b01
´
, 1−
√
k11√
a00
oo
The range of values of a00 for which coalition 00−10 is part of an equilibrium
outcome is larger if k11, k01, and a10 are smaller (see figures 13 and 14).
Similarly, for values of a00 large enough, the unique equilibrium coalition is
00− 01 and the set of equilibrium policies is given by
A∗ (00, 01) =
n
(0, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 : 1− 1−
√
k10√
b01
≤ y ≤ min
nq
a00
b00
³
1−
q
k10
a10
´
, 1−
√
k11√
b00
oo
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The range of values of a00 for which coalition 00−01 is part of an equilibrium
outcome is larger if k11, k10, and b01 are smaller (see figures 15 and 16).
We have seen that coalition 00−11 will never form in equilibrium (see figure
17) and that for intermediate values of a00, coalition 01− 11− 10 may form in
equilibrium only if a01 and b10 are large enough and k00 is small enough (see
figure 18).
We have shown that the parameter value that determines which equilibrium
prevails in this case is a00 (see figure 19). Observe that the conditions for
existence of equilibria with governing coalitions 00 − 01 and 00 − 10 are much
weaker that those needed for the equilibria with governing coalition 01 − 11 −
10. Indeed, the theorem states that it is most likely that the decision of the
dominant party, party 00 in this case, will determine which governing coalition
forms. Thus, the ’key party’ in the ’dominant party scenario’ coincides with
the dominant party itself. Finally, observe that the intuition behind this result
carries over to the case of a00 6= a11 and a01 6= a10, and the qualitative results
obtained here can be reproduced in the more general case.
7 Concluding remarks
From the analysis of the model of government formation presented above we
can draw the following implications:
i) coalitions of parties whose preferences diﬀer on both issues are not likely
ii) three party coalitions are not likely
iii) it is suﬃcient that the key party has intense preferences over one the
issues to guarantee the formation of a stable government coalition.
The main results, both about existence of equilibrium and about the com-
position of the equilibrium coalition, are determined by the value of the parties’
relative intensity of preferences. This value represents the relative strength of
a party’s position over one of the issues and in the model we present this value
is assumed to be exogenous. In reality this value is part of the party’s private
information, but given our results, a forward looking voter could use this value
as a way to explain the party’s decision and it could end up aﬀecting the vot-
ing decision of policy motivated voters. In this the case, it might be in the
party’s interest to use the revelation of the value of its relative the intensity of
preferences strategically. This observation points to an asymmetric information
model of government formation.
Endogenous Value of Holding Oﬃce:
We have assumed that a party’s value of holding oﬃce was exogenous. One
could argue that a party’s value of holding oﬃce today depends on its vote share,
or on the proportion of parliament seats obtained by the party, if we were
assuming proportional representation. Thus we could endogenize the present
value of holding oﬃce by representing it as a function of the party’s current
vote share. Suppose that ki = k (vi) with k0i (vi) ≥ 0. In this case we would be
assuming that the larger the vote share of a party, the larger the utility that it
derives from holding oﬃce, and the more it would be willing to compromise its
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policy position in order to become a member of the winning coalition. Thus,
the sets of policies that are individually rational will be larger for parties with
larger representation in the parliament.
This would imply that in the dominated party scenario, the coalition of
parties that disagree on both issues would be less likely to form when the vote
share of the key party is larger. Similarly, in the dominant party scenario, the
three party coalition would be less likely to form when the vote share of the
dominant party is larger.
Empty Sets of Acceptable Policies:
In the previous analysis we have assumed that the set of acceptable policies
was not empty for all relevant coalition. If we assume that for some minimal
winning coalitions the set of acceptable policies is empty. then the equilibrium
conditions are relaxed: the analysis is simplified and existence of equilibrium
exists for a wider range of parameter values.
Suppose that we are in the "dominated party scenario" and as before the
dominated party is party 10. If we assume that the set of acceptable policies by
the winning coalition 00−11 is empty, the only possible equilibrium coalitions are
given by 00−01, and 01−11. In this case, party 01 has to decide which coalition
to join: either 01 − 00 or 01 − 11. Party 01 will compare the outcomes it can
obtain from each negotiation and decide to join the coalition whose final outcome
gives it a larger utility. Observe that in this case existence of equilibrium is
guaranteed for all parameter values and the larger is a01 the more likely it is
that party 01 ends up forming coalition 00− 01.
Now suppose that we are in the "dominant party scenario" and as before
we assume that party 00 is the dominant party. If we assume that the set of
acceptable policies by the three party coalition is empty, then party 00 has to
decide which coalition to form: either 00− 01, 00− 11 or 00− 10. Notice that
the larger is a00 (the smaller is b00) the more likely is that party 00 chooses to
form coalition 00 − 01; and the smaller is a00 the more likely is that party 00
chooses to form coalition 00− 10.
Asymmetric Ideal Points:
An assumption that has simplified the calculus in this paper is the location
of the ideal points of the four parties at the vertices of the unit square. This
assumption could be relaxed considering, for instance (0, 1) , (p, p) , (p0, p0) , and
(1, 0), with 0 < p < 1/2 < p0 < 1.
As before, the relevant policy space will be delimited by the Pareto Set,
which can be computed solving the corresponding maximization problems. For
example, the following problem will give us as a solution the Pareto optimal
policies of coalition 01− pp:
max−a01x2 − b01 (1− y)2
s.t.− app (p− x)2 − bpp (p− y)2 ≥ upp
From the first order conditions we obtain − a01x
app(x−p) =
b01(1−y)
bpp(p−y) . This condi-
tion determines the set of Pareto optimal policies for coalition 01− pp.
In particular, when a01 = app we have that y = 1− 1−pp x (see figure 20) and
the contract curve is represented by a straight line. Otherwise, when a01 6= ap,
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we find that the contract curve would be concave or convex depending on the
relative values of the preference intensity of the parties (see figure 21). Thus, it
could be shown that all qualitative results of our basic model carry over to this
more general case.
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9 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
1) Since we have assumed that vi < 12 for all i, a coalition obtained by
removing any party from any coalition of two parties may not be supported by
a majority of the votes.
2) There are exactly six winning coalitions of two parties, and if a two party
coalition is supported by a majority of the votes then its complementary is a
two party coalition that cannot be a winning coalition.
3) Since we have assumed that vi < 12 for all i, any coalition formed by three
parties is always supported by a majority of the votes.
4) Suppose that there is a minimal winning coalition that leaves party i
out. Then, all remaining coalitions of three parties must include party i and all
coalitions of two parties that include party i are winning coalitions. Therefore,
there cannot be any other minimal winning coalition of three parties. F
Proof of Proposition 2:
i) Suppose that there is a minimal winning coalition that leaves party i out.
Then, all coalitions of two parties that include party i are winning coalitions.
There are exactly three coalitions of two parties that include party i. By propo-
sition 1 there are exactly three winning coalitions of two parties. Therefore,
party i is a member of all minimal winning coalitions of two parties.
ii) Since there is no minimal winning coalition of three parties, from i) we
know that no party can be a member of three winning coalitions of two parties.
Since by proposition 1 there are exactly three winning coalitions of two parties,
there must be at least one party included in exactly two winning coalitions of
two parties. Suppose that it is party i and we have that vi+vj > 12 , vi+vk >
1
2 ,
and vi + vl < 12 . This implies that vk + vl <
1
2 , vj + vl <
1
2 , and vj + vk >
1
2 .
Thus party l is not included in any of the winning coalitions. Therefore, there
must be one party that is not included in any of the winning coalitions. F
Proof of Proposition 3:
Consider coalition 00 − 01. It is easy to see that Pareto optimal policies
within the bargaining set of coalition 00−01 must satisfy (x, y) = (0, y) for any
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y ∈ [0, 1] .Negotiating on the second dimension, party 00 will only accept policies
that give it at least its reservation value, that is, values of y such that U00 (x, y) =
k00− b00 (y)2 ≥ 0 or y ≤
q
k00
b00
. Similarly, party 01 will only accept policies that
give it at least its reservation value, that is, values of y such that U01 (x, y) =
k01 − b01 (1− y)2 ≥ 0 or y ≥ 1−
q
k01
b01
. Therefore, the set of policies supported
by coalition 00− 01 is not empty if and only if 1 ≤
q
k01
b01
+
q
k00
b00
. Notice that
if ki
bi
> 12 for i = 00 and 01 then this condition holds. In this case, there is a
continuum of values for y in the interval [0, 1] that are acceptable by both parties,
given by the set: A (00, 01) =
n
(0, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 : 1−
q
k01
b01
≤ y ≤
q
k00
b00
o
.
The ideal point of party 00 does not belong to this set if and only if 1 −q
k01
b01
> 0, that is k01 < b01; and the ideal point of party 01 does not belong to
this set if and only if
q
k00
b00
< 1, that is k00 < b00.
The same argument could be applied to find the set of acceptable policies
for coalition 11− 10. F
Proof of Proposition 4:
Consider coalition 00−11. In this case the Pareto optimal policies within the
bargaining set of coalition 00−11 are the solution to the following maximization
problem:
max k11 − a11 (1− x)2 − b11 (1− y)2
s.t.k00 − a00 (x)2 − b00 (y)2 ≥ 0
From the first order conditions we obtain a11(1−x)
b11(1−y) =
a00x
b00y
. This condition
determines the set of Pareto optimal policies for coalition 00 − 11. Since we
assume that a00 = a11, we have that this set contains all (x, y) such that x =
y ∈ (0, 1) .
The subset of Pareto optimal policies that are accepted by coalition 00− 11
has to provide each party in the coalition with a utility level of at least its reser-
vation value, that is, they have to satisfy the following conditions: U00 (x, x) =
k00 − a00x2 − b00x2 ≥ 0 and U11 (x, x) = k11 − a00 (1− x)2 − b00 (1− x)2 ≥ 0.
Thus we must have that x ≤
√
k00 and x ≥ 1 −
√
k11. Observe that there is a
value of x such that 1−
√
k11 ≤ x ≤
√
k00 if and only if 1 ≤
√
k11 +
√
k00.
Therefore, the set of policies that are acceptable by coalition 00− 11 when
a00 = a11 is A (00, 11; a00 = a11) =
n
(x, x) ∈ [0, 1]2 : 1−
√
k11 ≤ x ≤
√
k00
o
.
The ideal point of party 00 does not belong to this set of policies acceptable
by this coalition if and only if U11 (0, 0) = k11 − a11 − b11 = −1 < 0, that is,
k11 < 1. Similarly, the ideal point of party 11 does not belong to this set if and
only if U00 (1, 1) = k00 − a00 − b00 = −1 < 0, that is, k00 < 1.
A similar argument can be applied to characterize the set of acceptable
policies by coalition 01− 10. F
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Proof of Proposition 5:
A suﬃcient condition for non emptiness of the set of Individually Rational
policies for parties 00 and 11 is the following: Ui
¡
1
2 , y
¢
= 0 for y > 12 , for
i ∈ {00, 11} and for all ai ∈ (0, 1) . (See figure 9)
Consider the case of party 00. We have that U00
¡
1
2 , y
¢
= k00 − a00
¡
1
2
¢2 −
b00 (y)
2 = 0. Therefore, y =
q
k00− a004
b00
> 12 if and only if k00 −
a00
4 >
1−a00
4 if
and only if k00 > 14 .
Since this result holds for all values of a00 ∈ (0, 1), then with a symmetric
argument we also obtain that if U11
¡
1
2 , y
¢
= 0 then y < 12 for all values of
a11 ∈ (0, 1) when k11 > 14 .
Thus we have shown that if ki > 14 for all i, generically there is a continuum
of policies in the set of acceptable policies by coalition 00− 11. (See figure 10)
The ideal point of party 00 does not belong to this set if and only if U11 (0, 0) =
k11−a11−b11 = k11−1 < 0, that is, k11 < 1. Similarly, the ideal point of party 11
does not belong to this set if and only if U00 (1, 1) = k00−a00−b00 = k00−1 < 0,
that is, k00 < 1.
A similar argument can be applied to characterize the set of acceptable
policies by coalition 01− 10. F
Proof of Theorem 1:
Since there are three minimal winning coalitions, there are three possible
equilibrium coalitions in this scenario: 00− 01, 01− 11, and 00− 11.
1) Coalition 00− 01: In this case the policy outcome will be a policy in the
set of policies supported by coalition 00 − 01 that gives party 00 and party 01
at least the same utility that they could obtain from the best oﬀer they could
have from party 11.
In order to have coalition 00 − 01 forming we need to show that there is a
policy supported by this coalition that gives party 00 and party 01 at least the
same utility that they could obtain from the best oﬀer they could have from
party 11. First notice that since U11
³
1−
q
k11
a11
, 1
´
= 0, the best oﬀer that party
01may obtain from party 11 gives it a utility level equal to: U01
³
1−
q
k11
a11
, 1
´
=
k01 − a01
³
1−
q
k11
a11
´2
. Notice that U01
³
1−
q
k11
a11
, 1
´
> 0 from proposition 3.
The possible oﬀers from party 00 that give party 01 a utility level of at least
k01 − a01
³
1−
q
k11
a11
´2
have to satisfy that U01 (0, y) = k01 − b01 (1− y)2 ≥
k01 − a01
³
1−
q
k11
a11
´2
, that is, y ≥ 1−
q
a01
b01
³
1−
q
k11
a11
´
.
Next observe that if a00 = a11, the best oﬀer that party 00 may obtain
from party 11 gives it a utility level equal to: U00
¡
1−
√
k11, 1−
√
k11
¢
=
k00−
¡
1−
√
k11
¢2
. Notice that U00
¡
1−
√
k11, 1−
√
k11
¢
> k00− (1− v00) from
proposition 5. The possible oﬀers from party 01 that give party 00 a utility
level of k00 −
¡
1−
√
k11
¢2
have to satisfy that U00 (0, y) = k00 − b00 (y)2 ≥
k00 −
¡
1−
√
k11
¢2
, that is, y ≤ 1−
√
k11√
b00
.
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Thus the policy that is supported by coalition 00 − 01 and gives party 00
and party 01 at least the same utility that they could obtain from the best oﬀer
they could have from party 11, has to satisfy:
1−
q
a01
b01
³
1−
q
k11
a11
´
≤ y ≤ 1−
√
k11√
b00
.
Such a policy exists if and only if 1−
q
a01
b01
³
1−
q
k11
a11
´
≤ 1−
√
k11√
b00
, which can
be written as a01 ≥ 1
1+


1−
r
k11
a11
1−
1−
√
k11√
b00


2 . Thus, we need a01 to be large enough. In
this case, coalition 00−01 forms and the policy outcome is the set A∗ (00− 01) =n
(0, y) ∈ [0, 1]2 : 1−
q
a01
b01
³
1−
q
k11
a11
´
≤ y ≤ 1−
√
k11√
b00
o
. See figure 10.
2) Coalition 01− 11: In this case the policy outcome will be a policy in the
set of policies supported by coalition 01 − 11 that gives party 01 and party 11
at least the same utility that they could obtain from the best oﬀer they could
have from party 00.
In order to have coalition 01 − 11 forming we need to show that there
is a policy supported by this coalition that gives party 01 and party 11 at
least the same utility that they could obtain from the best oﬀer they could
have from party 00. First notice that since U00
³
0,
q
k00
b00
´
= 0, the best of-
fer that party 01 may obtain from party 00 gives it a utility level equal to:
U01
³
0,
q
k00
b00
´
= k01 − b01
³
1−
q
k00
b00
´2
. Notice that U01
³
0,
q
k00
b00
´
> 0 from
proposition 4. The possible oﬀers from party 11 that give party 01 a utility
level of k01 − b01
³
1−
q
k00
b00
´2
have to satisfy that U01 (x, 1) = k01 − a01x2 ≥
k01 − b01
³
1−
q
k00
b00
´2
, that is, x ≤
q
b01
a01
³
1−
q
k00
b00
´
.
Next observe that if a00 = a11, the best oﬀer that party 11 may obtain from
party 00 gives it a utility level equal to: U11
¡√
k00,
√
k00
¢
= k11−
¡
1−
√
k00
¢2
.
Notice that U11
¡√
k00,
√
k00
¢
> 0 from proposition 5. The possible oﬀers from
party 01 that give party 11 a utility level of k11 −
¡
1−
√
k00
¢2
have to satisfy
that U11 (x, 1) = k11−a11 (1− x)2 ≥ k11−
¡
1−
√
k00
¢2
, that is, x ≥ 1− 1−
√
k00√
a11
.
Thus the policy that is supported by coalition 01 − 11 and gives party 01
and party 11 at least the same utility that they could obtain from the best oﬀer
they could have from party 00, has to satisfy:
1− 1−
√
k00√
a11
≤ x ≤
q
b01
a01
³
1−
q
k00
b00
´
Such a policy exists if and only if 1− 1−
√
k00√
a11
≤
q
b01
a01
³
1−
q
k00
b00
´
, which can
be written as a01 ≤ 1
1+


1−
1−
√
k00√a11
1−
r
k00
b00


2 . Thus, we need a01 to be small enough. In
this case, coalition 01−11 forms and the policy outcome is the set A∗ (01− 11) =n
(x, 1) ∈ [0, 1]2 : 1− 1−
√
k00√
a11
≤ x ≤
q
b01
a01
³
1−
q
k00
b00
´o
.
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See figure 9.
3) Coalition 00− 11: In this case the policy outcome will be a policy in the
set of policies supported by coalition 00 − 11 that gives party 00 and party 11
at least the same utility that they could obtain from the best oﬀer they could
have from party 01.
In order to have coalition 00 − 11 forming we need to show that there is a
policy supported by this coalition that gives party 00 and party 11 at least the
same utility that they could obtain from the best oﬀer they could have from
party 01.
First notice that the best oﬀer that party 00 can obtain from party 01 is³
0, 1−
q
k01
b01
´
, and the best oﬀer that party 11 can obtain from party 01 is³q
k01
a01
, 1
´
.
We need to show that there is a policy (x, y) such that it is acceptable by
coalition 00−11, (x, y) ∈ A (00− 11) and such that U00 (x, y) ≥ U00
³
0, 1−
q
k01
b01
´
=
k00−b00
³
1−
q
k01
b01
´2
and U11 (x, y) ≥ U11
³q
k01
a01
, 1
´
= k11−a11
³
1−
q
k01
a01
´2
.
If we assume that a00 = a11 we have that (x, y) = (x, x) , thus we need to
show that there is a value of x ∈ [0, 1] such that k00−x2 ≥ k00−b00
³
1−
q
k01
b01
´2
and k11 − (1− x)2 ≥ k11 − a11
³
1−
q
k01
a01
´2
therefore, we need x ≤
√
b00
³
1−
q
k01
b01
´
and x ≥ 1−√a11
³
1−
q
k01
a01
´
Thus, the equilibrium policies for coalition 00 − 11 will be those (x, x) ∈
A (00− 11) such that 1−√a11
³
1−
q
k01
a01
´
≤ x ≤
√
b00
³
1−
q
k01
b01
´
.
Since we assume that the sets of acceptable policies by all wining coali-
tions are not empty, by propositions 3 and 4 we have that 1 −
√
k11 ≤ 1 −√
a11
³
1−
q
k01
a01
´
and
√
b00
³
1−
q
k01
b01
´
≤
√
k00.
Since, we have that the set of acceptable policies by coalition 00− 11 is
A (00− 11; a00 = a11) =
n
(x, x) ∈ [0, 1]2 : 1−
√
k11 ≤ x ≤
√
k00
o
We conclude a necessary and suﬃcient condition for this equilibrium to exist
is
1 ≤ √a11
³
1−
q
k01
a01
´
+
√
b00
³
1−
q
k01
b01
´
.
This condition is more likely to be satisfied the larger a11 and b00 are and
the smaller k01 is. See figure 11. F
Proof of Theorem 2:
Since there are four minimal winning coalitions, there are four possible equi-
librium coalitions in this scenario; 00− 01, 00− 11, 00− 10, and 01− 11− 10.
1) Coalition 00− 01: In this case the policy outcome will be a policy in the
set of policies supported by coalition 00 − 01 that: gives party 00 at least the
same utility that it could obtain from joining either party 11 or party 10 in a
coalition, and gives party 01 least the same utility that it could obtain from
joining the three party coalition.
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Formally, coalition 00−01 can be part of an equilibrium outcome if and only
if there is a value ey ∈ [0, 1] such that:
i) U01 (0, ey) ≥ U01 (x01 (01− 11− 10) , y01 (01− 11− 10))
ii) U00 (x, y) < U00 (0, ey) for all (x, y) such that U10 (x, y) ≥ 0
iii) U00 (x, y) < U00 (0, ey) for all (x, y) such that U11 (x, y) ≥ 0
iv) U00 (0, ey) ≥ 0
Condition (i) implies that ey has to satisfy: U01 (0, ey) = k01 − b01 (1− ey)2 ≥
k01 −
¡
1−
√
k10
¢2
= U01 (x01 (01− 11− 10) , y01 (01− 11− 10)), that is, ey ≥
1− 1−
√
k10√
b01
.
To prove condition (ii) it suﬃces show that for x such that U10 (x, 0) = k10−
a10 (1− x)2 = 0, that is, x = 1−
q
k10
a10
, we must have that U00
³
1−
q
k10
a10
, 0
´
=
k00−a00
³
1−
q
k10
a10
´2
≤ k00−b00 (ey)2 = U00 (0, ey), that is, ey ≤qa00b00 ³1−qk10a10´ .
To prove condition (iii) it suﬃces to show that for x such that U11 (x, x) =
k11−(1− x)2 = 0, that is, x = 1−
√
k11, we must have that U00
¡
1−
√
k11, 1−
√
k11
¢
=
k00 −
¡
1−
√
k11
¢2
< k00 − b00 (ey)2 = U00 (0, ey), that is, ey ≤ 1−√k11√b00 .
Condition (iv) is always satisfied since we assume that the sets of acceptable
policies for each coalition are not empty.
Thus, this coalition will form in equilibrium if and only if:
1 ≤ 1−
√
k10√
b01
+min
nq
a00
b00
³
1−
q
k10
a10
´
, 1−
√
k11√
b00
o
And the policy implemented in this case is (0, ey) such that
1− 1−
√
k10√
b01
≤ ey ≤ minnqa00
b00
³
1−
q
k10
a10
´
, 1−
√
k11√
b00
o
Observe that
q
a00
b00
³
1−
q
k10
a10
´
≤ 1−
√
k11√
b00
if and only if a00 ≤
Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k10
a10
!2
.
In this case the condition that has to be satisfied is 1 ≤ 1−
√
k10√
b01
+
q
a00
b00
³
1−
q
k10
a10
´
.
And this condition holds if and only if a00 ≥ 1
1+


1−
r
k10
a10
1−
1−
√
k10√
b01


2 . Therefore, we
need 1
1+


1−
r
k10
a10
1−
1−
√
k10√
b01


2 ≤ a00 ≤
Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k10
a10
!2
.
Such a value for a00 exists if and only if 1
1+


1−
r
k10
a10
1−
1−
√
k10√
b01


2 ≤
Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k10
a10
!2
.
Otherwise, we have that
q
a00
b00
³
1−
q
k10
a10
´
≥ 1−
√
k11√
b00
if and only if a00 ≥Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k10
a10
!2
. In this case the condition that has to be satisfied is 1 ≤ 1−
√
k10√
b01
+
22
1−
√
k11√
b00
. And this condition holds if and only if a00 ≥ 1−
Ã
1−
√
k11
1− 1−
√
k10√
b01
!2
. There-
fore, we need a00 ≥ max



Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k10
a10
!2
, 1−
Ã
1−
√
k11
1− 1−
√
k10√
b01
!2
 .
It can be shown that
Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k10
a10
!2
≥ 1 −
Ã
1−
√
k11
1− 1−
√
k10√
b01
!2
if and only if
1
1+


1−
r
k10
a10
1−
1−
√
k10√
b01


2 ≤
Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k10
a10
!2
.
In particular we have coalition 00−01 in equilibrium for all a00 ≥ 1
1+


1−
r
k10
a10
1−
1−
√
k10√
b01


2 =
1−
Ã
1−
√
k11
1− 1−
√
k10√
b01
!2
and:
i) If 1
1+


1−
r
k10
a10
1−
1−
√
k10√
b01


2 ≤
Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k10
a10
!2
the equilibrium conditions are given by
the potential oﬀers to party 00 from parties 10 and 11. See figure 15.
ii) If 1
1+


1−
r
k10
a10
1−
1−
√
k10√
b01


2 ≥
Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k10
a10
!2
the oﬀers that party 00 may obtain
from party 10 are not binding, thus the conditions are given by the potential
oﬀers from party 11. See figure 16.
2) Coalition 00− 10: In this case the policy outcome will be a policy in the
set of policies supported by coalition 00 − 10 that: gives party 00 at least the
same utility that it could obtain from joining either party 01 or party 11 in a
coalition, and gives party 10 least the same utility that it could obtain from
joining the three party coalition.
Formally, coalition 00−10 can be part of an equilibrium outcome if and only
if there is a value ex ∈ [0, 1] such that:
i) U10 (ex, 0) ≥ U10 (x10 (01− 11− 10) , y10 (01− 11− 10))
ii) U00 (x, y) < U00 (ex, 0) for all (x, y) such that U01 (x, y) ≥ 0
iii) U00 (x, y) < U00 (ex, 0) for all (x, y) such that U11 (x, y) ≥ 0
iv) U00 (ex, 0) ≥ 0
See figures 13 and 14. Condition (i) implies that ex has to satisfy: U10 (ex, 0) =
k10−a10 (1− ex)2 ≥ k10−¡1−√k01¢2 = U10 (x10 (01− 11− 10) , y10 (01− 11− 10)),
that is, ex ≥ 1− 1−√k01√
a10
.
To prove condition (ii) it suﬃces show that for y such that U01 (0, y) = k01−
23
b01 (1− y)2 = 0, that is, y = 1−
q
k01
b01
we must have that U00
³
0, 1−
q
k01
b01
´
=
k00−b00
³
1−
q
k01
b01
´2
≤ k00−a00 (ex)2 = U00 (ex, 0), that is, ex ≤q b00a00 ³1−qk01b01 ´ .
To prove condition (iii) it suﬃces to show that for x such that U11(x, x) =
k11−(1− x)2 = 0, that is, x = 1−
√
k11, we must have that U00
¡
1−
√
k11, 1−
√
k11
¢
=
k00 −
¡
1−
√
k11
¢2
< k00 − a00 (ex)2 = U00 (0, ex), that is, ex ≤ 1−√k11√a00 .
Condition (iv) is always satisfied since we assume that all sets of acceptable
policies are not empty.
Thus, this coalition will form in equilibrium if and only if:
1 ≤ 1−
√
k01√
a01
+min
nq
b00
a00
³
1−
q
k01
b01
´
, 1−
√
k11√
a00
o
And the policy implemented in this case is (ex, 0) such that
1− 1−
√
k01√
a01
≤ ex ≤ minnq b00
a00
³
1−
q
k01
b01
´
, 1−
√
k11√
a00
o
Observe that
q
b00
a00
³
1−
q
k01
b01
´
≤ 1−
√
k11√
a00
if and only if b00 ≤
Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k01
b01
!2
.
In this case the condition that has to be satisfied is 1 ≤ 1−
√
k01√
a10
+
q
b00
a00
³
1−
q
k01
b01
´
.
And this condition holds if and only if b00 ≥ 1
1+


1−
r
k01
b01
1−
1−
√
k01√a10


2 . Therefore, we
need 1
1+


1−
r
k01
b01
1−
1−
√
k01√a10


2 ≤ b00 ≤
Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k01
b01
!2
.Such a value for b00 exists if and
only if 1
1+


1−
r
k01
b01
1−
1−
√
k01√a10


2 ≤
Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k01
b01
!2
.
Otherwise,
q
b00
a00
³
1−
q
k01
b01
´
≥ 1−
√
k11√
a00
if and only if b00 ≥
Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k01
b01
!2
. In
this case the condition that has to be satisfied is 1 ≤ 1−
√
k01√
a10
+ 1−
√
k11√
a00
. And
this condition holds if and only if b00 ≥ 1−
Ã
1−
√
k11
1− 1−
√
k01√a10
!2
. Therefore, we need
b00 ≥ max



Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k01
b01
!2
, 1−
Ã
1−
√
k11
1− 1−
√
k01√a10
!2
 .
It can be shown that
Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k01
b01
!2
≥ 1−
Ã
1−
√
k11
1− 1−
√
k01√a10
!2
if and only if 1
1+


1−
r
k01
b01
1−
1−
√
k01√a10


2 ≤
24
Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k01
b01
!2
.
Therefore, we must have 1−
Ã
1−
√
k11
1− 1−
√
k01√a10
!2
= 1
1+


1−
r
k01
b01
1−
1−
√
k01√a10


2 .
In particular we have coalition 00−10 in equilibrium for all b00 ≥ 1
1+


1−
r
k01
b01
1−
1−
√
k01√a10


2
and:
i) If 1
1+


1−
r
k01
b01
1−
1−
√
k01√a10


2 ≤
Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k01
b01
!2
the equilibrium conditions are given by
the potential oﬀers to party 00 from parties 01 and 11.
ii) If 1
1+


1−
r
k01
b01
1−
1−
√
k01√a10


2 ≥
Ã
1−
√
k11
1−
q
k01
b01
!2
the oﬀers that party 00 may obtain
from party 01 are not binding, thus the conditions are given by the potential
oﬀers from party 11.
3) Coalition 01 − 11 − 10: In this case the policy outcome will be a policy
in the set of policies supported by the three party coalition 01 − 11 − 10 that
gives party 01, party 11, and party 10 at least the same utility that they could
obtain from the best oﬀer they could have from party 00.
In order to have coalition 01−11−10 forming we need to show that there is
a policy in the set of acceptable policies by the three party coalition such that
each party in the coalition prefers this policy to the best oﬀer that party 00
could make. Since we have already shown that there is no oﬀer from party 00
to party 11 that would be preferred by the later to a policy that is acceptable
by the coalition of three parties, we only need to take care of oﬀers from party
00 to parties 01 and 10.
Thus, it is necessary that the best oﬀer from party 00 to parties 01 and 10 is
not preferred by these parties to best oﬀer that they can obtain from coalition
01−11−10. First notice that the best oﬀer that party 01 can obtain from party
00 is
³
0,
q
k00
b00
´
, and the best oﬀer that party 10 can obtain from party 00 is³q
k00
a00
, 0
´
.
We will first show that there is a policy (x, y) such that it is acceptable by
coalition 01−10, (x, y) ∈ A (01− 10) and such that U01 (x, y) ≥ U01
³
0,
q
k00
b00
´
=
k00 − b01
³q
k00
b00
´2
and U10 (x, y) ≥ U10
³q
k00
a00
, 0
´
= k11 − a10
³
1−
q
k00
a00
´2
.
If we assume that a01 = a10 we have that (x, y) = (x, 1− x) , thus we need
to show that there is a value of x ∈ [0, 1] such that k01−x2 ≥ k00−b01
³q
k00
b00
´2
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and k11 − (1− x)2 ≥ k11 − a10
³
1−
q
k00
a00
´2
therefore, we need x ≤
√
b01
³
1−
q
k00
b00
´
and x ≥ 1−√a10
³
1−
q
k00
a00
´
Thus, the equilibrium policies for coalition 01 − 10 will be those (x, x) ∈
A (01− 10) such that 1−√a10
³
1−
q
k00
a00
´
≤ x ≤
√
b01
³
1−
q
k00
b00
´
.
Since, we assume that the sets of acceptable policies by all relevant coali-
tions are not empty, we have that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for this
equilibrium to exist is
1 ≤ √a10
³
1−
q
k00
a00
´
+
√
b01
³
1−
q
k00
b00
´
.
This condition is more likely to be satisfied the larger a01 and b01 are and
the smaller k00 is. See figure 18.
4) Coalition 00 − 11: In this case the policy outcome would be a policy in
the set of policies supported by coalition 00 − 11 that: gives party 00 at least
the same utility that it could obtain from joining either party 01 or party 10 in
a coalition, and gives party 11 least the same utility that it could obtain from
joining the three party coalition.
Consider any policy (ex e, y) that belongs to the set of acceptable policies by the
coalition of three parties 01−11−10. Then for any (x, y) such that U11 (x, y) ≥
U11 (ex e, y) we must have one of the three following conditions holding:
i) U01 (x, y) ≥ 0
ii) U10 (x, y) ≥ 0
iii) U01 (x, y) < 0 and U10 (x, y) < 0.
Observe that:
(i) implies that: U00 (x, y) < U00 (0, y) and U01 (x, y) < U01 (0, y) .
(ii) implies that: U00 (x, y) < U00 (x, 0) and U10 (x, y) < U10 (x, 0) .
(iii) implies that: U00 (x, y) < U00 (0, y) and U01 (x, y) < U01 (0, y) ; and
U00 (x, y) < U00 (x, 0) and U10 (x, y) < U10 (x, 0) .
Therefore, for any oﬀer from party 00 that might be accepted by party 11,
there is an oﬀer from either party 01 or party 10 that is preferred by party 00.
See figure 17.
F
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FIGURE 3: Policies acceptable by coalitions of 
2 parties that agree on one issue. 
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FIGURE 4: Pareto Optimality for 
coalition 00-11. 
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FIGURE 5: Individual rationality 
constraints for coalition 00-11. 
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FIGURE 6: Policies acceptable by 
coalition 00-11. 
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FIGURE 7: Non-empty set of policies 
acceptable by coalition 01-11-10. 
FIGURE 8: Empty set of policies 
acceptable by coalition 01-11-10. 
y 
0 1 
1 
• •
• •
x 
U11=0 
U10=0 
U01=0 
y 
0 1 
1 
• •
• •
x 
U11=0 
U10=0 
U01=0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
y 
0 1 
1 
• •
• •
FIGURE 10: Dominated party scenario. 
Coalition 01-00 in equilibrium. 
x 
U11=0 
U01=0 
U00=0 
y 
0 1 
1 
• •
• •
FIGURE 11: Dominated party scenario. 
Coalition 00-11 in equilibrium. 
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FIGURE 12: Dominated party scenario.  
Equilibrium coalitions depending on the value of a01.  
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FIGURE 9: Dominated party scenario. 
Coalition 01-11 in equilibrium. 
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FIGURE 15: Dominant party scenario. 
Coalition 00-01 in equilibrium. Set of 
policies determined by party 10 threat. 
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FIGURE 16: Dominant party scenario. 
Coalition 00-01 in equilibrium. Set of 
policies determined by party 11 threat. 
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FIGURE 13: Dominant party scenario. 
Coalition 00-10 in equilibrium. Set of 
policies determined party 01 threat. 
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FIGURE 14: Dominant party scenario. 
Coalition 00-10 in equilibrium. Set of 
policies determined party 11 threat. 
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FIGURE 17. Dominant party scenario. 
Coalition 00-11 cannot be part of an 
equilibrium.  
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FIGURE 18: Dominant party scenario. 
Coalition 01-11-10 may be part of an 
equilibrium. 
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FIGURE 19: Dominant party scenario.  
Equilibrium coalitions depending on the value of a00. 
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FIGURE 21: ai ≠ aj for all i and j. 
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